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This study examines the validity of the gradual diffusion model of Hong and Stein 
(1999). Since 1975 the London stock market has employed three different trading 
systems: a floor based system, a computerised dealer system called SEAQ and the 
automated auction SETS system. We find that after the introduction of the 
computerised dealer system, the diffusion of information was faster across 
investors, but SEAQ momentum profits are stronger than when the floor based 
system operated. We also report that companies trading on the SETS auction 
system, in which share prices adjust faster to news, display greater momentum 
profitability than shares trading on SEAQ. These findings contradict to the 
theoretical results of the model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The momentum strategy describes the tendency for return performance to persist in 
the medium term. The pioneering work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) on the US 
market showed that by buying winners and selling short losers an abnormal monthly 
return of approximately 1 per cent could be achieved. Extensive evidence now 
exists in support of the momentum strategy for the US (e.g., Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt, 1999; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), for the UK (e.g., Liu et al., 1999; 
Hon and Tonks, 2003) and for a global range of stock markets (e.g., Griffin et al., 
2003; Rouwenhorst, 1998).   
A significant number of studies have considered the potential reasons for 
momentum, but no clear consensus has emerged. One of the most significant studies 
is that by Hong and Stein (1999)
1 who developed a model based on two rational 
                                                 
1 Some other significant studies that have explained momentum are the followings: Ang et al (2001) 
documented that the contents of the winner portfolio are characterised by more downside risk. The 
higher returns displayed by winners is compensation for this additional amount of risk investors 
would be exposed to when falling market arise. Barberis et al (1998) developed a model in which 
investors underreact to information about earnings. Du (2002) argued that investors can be 
characterised by high or low levels of confidence. Underreaction arises when investors with low 
confidence are slow to make decisions. Delays in acting upon information cause the effects of new 
information to persist inducing a continuation pattern in returns. Momentum profits have also been 
found to be influenced by firm level characteristics. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) reported that firms 
with high trading volume have higher momentum than firms with low trading volume. Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) showed that momentum is related to a firm’s industry. 
 
  3agents; newswatchers and momentum traders. Newswatchers observe some private 
information, but fail to be aware of the information that other investors have. When 
the private information of investors becomes public, prices adjust to new 
information and the momentum effect emerges. Therefore, the continuation 
hypothesis stems from the gradual expansion of information among investors.  
Hong et al. (2000), using US data, and Doukas and McKnight (2005), using 
information from 13 European countries, tested the validity of the Hong and Stein 
(1999). They found empirical support for the model as stocks exhibit higher 
momentum profits if information spreads slowly amongst investors: continuation 
profits are higher for smaller capitalisation shares and for securities with lower 
levels of analyst coverage.  
The novelty of this study is that it investigates the possible influence that an 
alternative influence of information diffusion has on momentum profitability. Since 
1975 the London stock market has employed three different trading systems: a floor 
based system, a computerised dealer system called SEAQ and an automated auction 
system called SETS. The characteristics of each system allow information to diffuse 
to prices at different rates.  
With the introduction of the SEAQ mechanism on 27
th October 1986, information 
disseminated widely and rapidly throughout the investor community with the 
Teletext Output Price Information Computer (TOPIC) network. The adoption of 
recent technological advances in computing and telecommunications allowed face-
to-face trading on the floor of the exchange to be replaced by telephone and 
electronic trading on the screen system. The Hong and Stein model would predict 
that since the post-Big Bang period is characterised by faster diffusion of 
  4information among investors, the magnitude of momentum profits should be lower 
after 1986.  
With the introduction of the SETS on 20
th October 1997, all FTSE 100 stocks, and 
later some additional shares from FTSE 250, have traded in a fully automated 
electronic auction system. Taylor et al. (2000) show that since the introduction of 
the SETS, both FTSE100 spot and futures prices adapt quicker to shocks. Chelley-
Steeley (2003) demonstrated that cross-listed shares adjust to their fundamental 
news more quickly when they trade on the Paris Bourse auction market than when 
they trade on the SEAQ International dealer system. The Hong and Stein model 
would predict that shares traded on the SETS auction system, in which share prices 
adjust more quickly to news, would generate lower momentum profits than shares 
traded on the SEAQ dealer mechanism.  
We report findings against the theoretical results of the model. First, we find that 
after the introduction of the computerised dealer system, SEAQ momentum profits 
are higher than when the floor based system operated. These results persist after 
controlling for size, book-to-market and risk as defined by the CAPM and the three-
factor model. Second, we report that shares trading on the SETS order-driven 
system demonstrate larger momentum profits than shares trading on the SEAQ 
quote-driven system. The difference in momentum profits between the two 
structures increases significantly after considering for size differences.  
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the trading 
systems.  Section 3 explains the data and how it has been utilised. Sections 4 and 5 
measure momentum in different market structures. Section 6 provides the 
conclusions. 
  52. TRADING SYSTEMS 
Prior to Big Bang in 1986 the London Stock Exchange utilised a floor based trading 
system that employed jobbers and brokers with single capacity. In response to 
dissatisfaction with the ability of floor based trading to encourage competition, cope 
with rising trade sizes and an increasing trend towards the internationalisation of 
capital markets (Thomas, 1989), a major overhaul of the London Stock Exchange 
trading system took place on 27
th of October 1986. These changes saw the 
introduction of a dual capacity electronic dealer system called SEAQ. 
In response to competition from order driven systems on other exchanges that offer 
lower trading costs the LSE introduced SETS on 20
th of October 1997. In contrast to 
SEAQ, SETS is a fully automated order driven system. SETS opens with a batch 
auction and allows continuous trading until the market closes. Unlike SEAQ, all 
orders are visible on SETS and no reporting delays are allowed enhancing both pre-
trade and post-trade transparency.  
Our examination of the link between momentum and trading activity is motivated 
by a range of studies that have shown that the trading mechanism can exert a strong 
influence on stock returns (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1996). In particular, the trading 
system plays an important part in determining trading activity.  In their examination 
of changes to the trading system on the Singapore stock exchange, Naidu and 
Rozeff (1994) documented a strong relationship between the trading system and 
trading activity. As shown by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) a positive relationship 
between trading volume and momentum profits can be expected. We predict that 
automated markets, which tend to have higher trading volume, are likely to give rise 
to higher momentum profits than floor based systems.  
  6Trading systems also influence the relative trading activities of institutional and 
small investors. The lower costs associated with auction mechanisms favour retail 
investors (e.g., Pagano and Roell, 1996; de Jong et al., 1995; Pagano, 1997), while 
market making facilities tend to attract large scale institutional trading (e.g., Pagano 
and Roell, 1996; Pagano, 1997). Du (2002) argued that investor behaviour 
contributes to the scale of momentum profits. The level of investor confidence 
influences the decision making speed of investors. This suggests that trading 
mechanisms that are more favourable to a particular investor type will encourage 
either fast decisions about equity (little momentum) or slow decisions (high 
momentum).  
It has also been shown that the trading system can influence informational 
efficiency. Auction systems are generally more transparent (Pagano and Roell, 
1996) and this may influence the rate of information diffusion. Since transparency is 
notably higher in auction systems such as SETS and Hong and Stein (1999) have 
argued that the rate of information diffusion influences momentum profits, we 
should expect a relationship between momentum and the type of trading system.  
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Monthly return information for all UK companies listed on the Master Index File of 
the London Share Price Database (LSPD) between October 1975 and October 2001 
are utilised in this study. The sample period focuses on the post-1975 period 
because LSPD only includes all British companies listed on the LSE after 1975.  In 
all this provides information on over 6,000 firms where the number of firms 
analysed in any given year ranges from 1,489 to 2,444 and constitutes our main 
sample. Our second sample is the accounting sub-sample. This is drawn from the 
  7main sample but requires from each firm accounting information on annual market 
value and book-to-market ratios. This information is available from Datastream for 
over 2,000 of the companies where the number of companies examined in any given 
year varies from 442 to 1,143. Our SETS sample reflects the 150 stocks that 
according to the London Stock Exchange
2 have traded on SETS. This sample 
extends from October 1997 to October 2001.  
To calculate momentum profitability, we rank each company on the basis of their 
stock market performance over the previous six months. We then place each 
security into one of ten equally sized portfolios.  The winner portfolio contains the 
best performing decile of securities and the loser portfolio contains the worst 
performing decile of securities
3. We skip one month to avoid potential market 
frictions identified by Jegadeesh (1990). We calculate the returns of each of the 
equally weighted portfolios over the following six-month period. This procedure is 
repeated for each non-overlapping six-month period. We omit the first six months 
after the Big Bang to prevent our results from reflecting an initial adjustment.  
We focus on the difference between winner and loser portfolio returns W-L. Table 1 
provides the results of the momentum strategy employed for deciles, quintiles and 
triciles. Past winners (W) outperform prior losers (L) over the test period by 0.96 
per cent per month when three portfolios are used (Panel A), 1.18 per cent when 
five portfolios are examined (Panel B) and 1.53 per cent per month when ten 
                                                 
2 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/products/membershiptrading/tradingservices/sets.htm  
3 We also define winners and losers using three and five portfolios that include respectively the top 
and bottom 30 and 20 per cent of shares.  
 
  8portfolios are employed (Panel C). A monotonic relationship exists between the size 
of momentum profits and prior performance. The magnitude of momentum profits 
reported is comparable with the results found by other studies employing 
international and UK data (e.g., Griffin et al., 2003).  
4. MOMENTUM PROFITS IN FLOOR AND AUTOMATED TRADING 
SYSTEMS 
(i) Initial Findings 
Table 1 shows that in the period before Big Bang monthly momentum profits are 
0.41 per cent when three portfolios are studied (Panel A), 0.50 per cent when five 
portfolios are employed (Panel B) and 0.73 per cent when ten portfolios are 
examined (Panel C). These returns are largely attributable to the performance of the 
winner portfolio. Post-Big Bang, monthly continuation payoffs are 1.38 (three 
portfolios), 1.69 (five portfolios) and 2.14 per cent (ten portfolios). Automated share 
trading appears to generate significantly larger momentum returns than shares 
trading on the floor based system. The difference in monthly momentum profits 
between automated and floor based trading is 0.97 (t-statistic=2.42) per cent using 
three portfolios, 1.19 (t-statistic=2.50) per cent examining five portfolios and 1.41 
(t-statistic=2.38) per cent studying ten portfolios
4.  
Figure 1 plots the continuation gains generated on the LSE and shows that most of 
the momentum profits associated with the automated sub-period come from the 
                                                 
4 In unreported results, the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test provides identical findings to those 
generated when a parametric test is employed.    
 
  91990-1993 period. The interruption of the lines in 1987 arises because we miss one 
test period at the time of the Big Bang. 
The stronger trading volume displayed after the Big Bang (Tonks and Webb, 1991) 
might explain the higher momentum profits after 1986. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) reported that a positive relationship between trading volume and momentum 
profits holds and therefore, the automated market, which tend to have higher trading 
volume, is likely to give rise to higher momentum profits than the floor based 
system
5.  
Asymmetry in the magnitude of momentum profits across the different time periods 
concurs with the results of Hon and Tonks (2003). They documented that 
momentum strategies were profitable between 1955 and 1996, but unprofitable 
between 1955 and 1976. We contradict Liu et al. (1999) who suggested that 






                                                 
5 We do not incorporate trading volume into our analysis, since Datastream does not provide trading 
volume data for shares before 1987. 
6 Liu et al. (1999) examined share returns from Datastream rather than LSPD returns which might 
explain the difference. Chakrabarty and Trzcinka (2004) reported that the use of TAQ rather than 
CRSP share returns can influence significantly the size of momentum profits, since databases set 
different criteria for listing/de-listing firms.   
 
  10(ii) Using Different Datasets 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that when the accounting sub-sample is employed, 
findings are identical to those reported for the full sample as shown earlier in Table 
1
7. The correlation on momentum profits between the full sample and the 
accounting sub-sample is strong with a Pearson correlation equals to 0.63.  
Panel A of Table 2 further shows that during the automated period market values 
tended to rise and book-to-market ratios fall. However changes in size and book-to-
market cannot explain differences in momentum across the two periods. The winner 
portfolio is characterised by higher market values in all samples. The arbitrage 
portfolio in the post-Big Bang period includes larger capitalisation companies than 
its counterpart arbitrage portfolio in the pre-Big Bang period. This finding suggests 
that after controlling for size, the difference in momentum gains before and after 
Big Bang should be even larger. In addition, the winner portfolio tends to include 
shares with lower book-to-market ratios than the loser portfolio. This result is 
consistent with Liu et al. (1999) and indicates that winners tend to be glamour 
stocks and losers value equities. 
We also examine the momentum profitability that the same shares generate in both 
structures by analysing companies that have return information for the duration of 
the whole sample period. Only 266 shares fulfil that condition. Panel B of Table 2 
demonstrates that the automated sub-period still provides higher monthly 
                                                 
7 Hereafter, we restrict only to the 10-portfolio analysis and to the winner and loser portfolio returns 
due to space consideration.  
  11momentum profits than the floor sub-period
8. The correlation on momentum profits 
between the full sample (accounting sub-sample) and this sub-sample is strong with 
a Pearson rank correlation equals to 0.72 (0.60). 
(iii) Controlling for Size and Book-to-Market 
A large number of studies have highlighted the influence that size and book-to-
market can have on share returns (e.g., Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992). The 
importance of controlling for firm size was highlighted by Zarowin (1990) in a 
study of long term overreaction as matching winners and losers on the basis of firm 
size caused evidence of overreaction to disappear. 
As a robustness test, we investigate whether changes in the book-to-market ratios 
across the two sub-periods can account for our results. To test this assertion, we 
apply a matching process similar to Daniel and Titman (1997) that was found to 
explain overreaction by Nagel (2001).  
Securities are first sorted into three groups based on their market capitalisation. 
Companies in each size-sorted group are further divided into three additional groups 
based on their book-to-market ratios. In all this provides nine portfolios. We 
calculate the returns of these nine size-book-to-market portfolios over the test 




it R R R − =                                                     (1) 
                                                 
8 Consistent with Hong et al. (2000), who reported a negative association between size and 
momentum profitability, shares used in this sub-sample expected to generate relatively low 
momentum profits.  
 
  12where  is the characteristic-adjusted return on security iduring month  ,   is 
the return on security   in month t, and  is the return on a size-book-to-market 
matched portfolio in month t. To undertake this procedure, we require book and 
market values. Since LSPD does not provide book values, we must utilise our 
smaller accounting sub-sample for this analysis.  
CH




Table 3 shows the size and book-to-market adjusted portfolio returns. We find that 
after controlling for size and book-to-market ratios, momentum profits decrease, 
especially when the automated system was in operation. Nevertheless continuation 
profits are economically significant using the entire period and abnormal returns are 
still much larger in the post-Big Bang period. This finding suggests that profits in 
the automated and floor-based system cannot be fully attributable to firm 
characteristics. The difference in momentum profitability between the two sub-
periods remains significant, although smaller than that obtained from unadjusted 
returns. Therefore, size and book-to-market cannot explain the difference in 
momentum gains generated before and after Big Bang. 
(iv)Risk Adjustments  
Initially, this study controls for risk based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We 
calculate the aggregate coefficient betas of Dimson (1979) to overcome the problem 
of infrequent trading that conventional betas exhibit. We estimate regressions of 
rank period portfolio returns against lagging, matching and leading market returns. 
  13The aggregate coefficient betas are determined by the number of leads and lags that 
are statistically significant
9. 
t i t k f t k m
n
n k
p p t f t p e R R a R R , , , , , , , ) ( + − + = − ∑
− =
β                        (2) 
where   is the return of portfolio  t p R , p in month t,   is the one-month Treasury 
Bill rate in month   and   is the return of the proxy market (FTSE All-Share) in 
month  . The aggregate coefficient beta is the sum of betas with different leads and 
lags.  
t f R ,
t t m R ,
t
Table 4 shows the portfolio aggregate betas. The winner portfolio displays lower 
aggregate betas than its counterpart loser portfolio. We also find that portfolios in 
the automated period tend to have higher betas, but the beta of the arbitrage 
portfolio ( L W − β ) is –0.22 for the automated period and 0.31 for the floor period. 
This result suggests that the arbitrage portfolio generates higher performance and 
experiences lower risk during the automated period
10. 
The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) shows that beta, size and book-
to-market should be taken into account when measuring risk-adjusted returns. Liu et 
al. (1999) reported that after controlling for the three-factor model, momentum 
                                                 
9 For example, four lags and two leads analysed for the loser portfolio and four lags and four leads 
for the winner portfolio. 
10 We extend the investigation and calculate the aggregate betas of the arbitrage portfolio examining 
alternative lags and leads (Table 5). When applying up to three lags and three leads, the beta of the 
arbitrage portfolio is always positive during the floor sub-period and negative during the automated 
sub-period.  
 
  14profits are lower than when only beta adjustments are made. This suggests that the 
three-factor model captures the momentum gains better than CAPM.  
We estimate the following regression: 
t p t p t p t f t m p p t f t p e HML h SMB s R R a R R , , , , , ) ( + + + − + = − β                   (3) 
where   is the return of portfolio  t p R , p in month t,   is the one-month Treasury 
Bill rate in month t, and   is the return of the proxy market (FTSE All-Share) in 
month  . We generate nine portfolios; shares are sorted into three groups based on 
the market value and then, each size-sorted portfolio divided further into three 
portfolios based on the book-to-market ratios.   (Small Minus Big) shows the 
portfolio that buys the three small size portfolios and sells short the three big size 
portfolios.   (High Minus Low) shows the portfolio that buys the three high 
book-to-market portfolios and sells short the three low book-to-market portfolios. 
t f R ,




Table 6 shows the sensitivities and the intercept of the model for the loser portfolio 
(Panel A), the winner portfolio (Panel B) and the arbitrage portfolio (Panel C). The 
alpha of the model demonstrates the abnormal profits that remained after 
considering the three factors. When market efficiency holds, alpha should be equal 
to zero. Findings show that the three-factor model cannot explain the differences 
across the two sub-periods. Continuation payoffs remain at 1.64 per cent per month 
during the period of automation, but lower at 0.80 per cent per month during the 
floor period. Consistent with Liu et al. (1999) and Fama and French (1996), the 
negative sensitivities to all three Fama and French factors and the relatively low 
adjusted R-squared values reinforce the inability of the model to capture 
momentum.  
  155. MOMENTUM PROFITS IN DEALER AND AUCTION TRADING SYSTEMS 
This section tests whether shares trading in dealer and auction systems generate 
different momentum profits. Table 7 reports that the magnitude of continuation 
profits is different when comparing quote-driven and order-driven mechanisms. We 
find that monthly momentum profits for shares trading on the SETS mechanism are 
1.20 per cent when three portfolios are examined, 2.01 per cent when five portfolios 
are studied and 2.94 per cent when ten portfolios are employed. These abnormal 
returns are driven by the loser portfolio and are significantly higher than those 
reported by shares trading on other systems between 1975 and 2001. Since auction 
mechanisms tend to generate lower execution costs than dealer systems (e.g., Huang 
and Stoll, 1996), the difference in the profitability of momentum profits generated 
by the two mechanisms is even greater than revealed by our data
11.  
Since the auction and dealer systems operate in parallel, we can compare directly 
the magnitude of profits from the two systems for the same periods. These simple 
controls were not possible when making comparisons of the automated and floor 
based periods. We find that stocks trading on SETS system generate almost 
identical momentum profits to those shares traded on the SEAQ.  
Companies trading on SETS and SEAQ are, however, different. Large companies 
trade on SETS and smaller companies on SEAQ. As shown by Hong et al. (2000), 
there exists a negative relationship between size and momentum profitability and 
since companies trading on SETS are the largest on the LSE, we would anticipate 
                                                 
11 Shares trading on the SETS auction system experience relatively high volatility (Chelley-Steeley, 
2002), which might be associated with the difference in momentum profits between auction and 
dealer systems. 
  16them to generate lower momentum profits. To adjust for size, we calculate 
momentum profits for the 150 largest companies (by market value) that have been 
trading on the SEAQ dealer system, as these will be most similar to those trading on 
SETS. Table 7 shows that the largest 150 shares trading on the SEAQ mechanism 
generate significantly lower continuation profits than their counterpart companies 
trading on SETS.  
We further calculate the continuation profits generated by the stocks on the SETS in 
the previous four years (1994-1997) when they were traded on the SEAQ system. 
Table 7 reports that the SETS stocks generate significantly lower returns when they 
were traded on the dealer system between 1994 and 1997, while the full sample 
demonstrates strong profits
12.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We found that momentum profits are significant when we use all listed companies 
on the LSE (over 6000 shares), a sub-sample of 2000 shares with additional 
accounting information, the SETS sample of 150 shares and a small number of 266 
stocks with complete return information from 1975 to 2001. We further documented 
that momentum profits persist after controlling for size, book-to-market and risk as 
defined by the CAPM and the three-factor model. These findings suggested that the 
momentum effect persists on the LSE using various data sets and after controlling 
for various factors influence share returns. 
                                                 
12 Full risk adjustment tests have not been undertaken, since the SETS sample includes a very small 
number of companies. For example, if the size and book-to-market adjustment was undertaken, we 
should have generated nine portfolios with each portfolio including only 17 shares.    
  17We also studied the impact that the trading system might have on momentum profits 
and is the first time this issue has been examined. The motivation to examine this 
field stems from the influence that different stock market structures have on stock 
returns. This study reported findings that contradict the gradual diffusion model of 
Hong and Stein (1999) showing that the validity of the model is fragile to the 
interpretation of the concept. Hong et al. (2000) and Doukas and McKnight (2005) 
associated the speed of information that flows among investors with the size and the 
analyst coverage of companies, while this study with alternative stock market 
trading mechanisms generating contradictory results.  
When we measured momentum profits in the period prior to and subsequent to the 
introduction of SEAQ, we found that shares trading in the post-Big Bang period, 
when a faster diffusion of information among investors holds, generate higher 
continuation profits than trading in the pre-deregulation floor period. This finding is 
robust to the employment of a sub-sample of firms and to a range of risk adjustment 
tests.  
When we examined the momentum profits generated from trading on SETS, we 
found that shares trading on the SETS order-driven system, in which share prices 
adjust more quickly to news, provide higher continuation profits than those trading 
on SEAQ.  The difference in momentum profits between the two structures widens 
significantly after taking into consideration share market values.  
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  22Table 1 
Momentum Profits in Floor and Automated Systems 
  Entire Period (1975-2001)  Floor Period (1975-1986)  Automated Period (1987-2001) 
Panel A: 3 Portfolios 
























Panel B: 5 Portfolios 




































Panel C: 10 Portfolios 



































































3 portfolios: winners (W) and losers (L) each comprise 30 per cent of the full sample. 
5 portfolios: winners and losers each include 20 per cent of the full sample. 
10 portfolios: winners and losers each comprise 10 per cent of the full sample. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  23Table 2 
Employing Different Datasets 
 
  Entire Period  Floor Period  Automated Period 
Panel A: Accounting sub-sample 
L  -0.19% 
(-0.48)   
1.24% 
(2.41)   
-1.22% 
(-2.2 )  9  
W  1.28% 
(5.42)   
2.20% 
(7.30)   
0.62% 
(1.8 )  5  
W-L  1.47% 
(3.22)   
0.96% 
(1.61)   
1.84% 
(2.9 )  2  
      
L        size 







W      size 







W-L   size 







Panel B: 266 shares  












































  24Table 3 





it R R R − =  
 
  Entire Period   Floor Period   Automated Period  
L  -0.61% 
      (-1.92)   
-0.36% 
   (-0.54)  
-0.79% 
    (-2.98)   
W  0.38% 
      (1.19)   
0.38% 
  (0.65)   
0.39% 
      (1.10)   
W-L  0.99% 
      (2.19)   
0.74% 
  (0.84)   
1.18% 



































  25Table 4 
Aggregate Betas 
t i t k f t k m
n
n k
p p t f t p e R R a R R , , , , , , , ) ( + − + = − ∑
− =
β  
  Entire period  Floor Period   Automated Period  
L 1.51  0.91  1.81 
2 1.17  0.85  1.37 
3 1.14  0.92  1.29 
4 1.10  0.93  1.22 
5 1.08  0.91  1.19 
6 1.08  0.98  1.14 
7 1.12  1.04  1.17 
8 1.09  0.93  1.21 
9 1.18  1.03  1.29 
W 1.42  1.22  1.59 


























  26Table 5 
Aggregate Betas of the Arbitrage Portfolio 
t i t k f t k m
n
n k




 -1  -2  -3 
+1  F    0.26 
A   -0.34 
F    0.44 
A   -0.24 
F    0.51 
A   -0.21 
      
+2  F    0.22 
A   -0.29 
F    0.40 
A   -0.19 
F    0.47 
A   -0.15 
      
+3  F    0.22 
A   -0.32 
F    0.40 
A   -0.21 
F    0.48 
A   -0.17 
Note: 


















  27Table 6 
Controlling for Risk with the Three-Factor Model  
t p t p t p t f t m p p t f t p e HML h SMB s R R a R R , , , , , ) ( + + + − + = − β  
  Entire period  Floor period  Automated period 
Panel A: Losers 
























2 R adj − 0.52  0.70 0.48 
Panel B: Winners 
























2 R adj − 0.51  0.76 0.41 
Panel C: Winners-Losers 
























2 R adj − 0.09  0.06 0.14 
 
 
  28Table 7 
Momentum Profits in Dealer and Auction Systems 












Panel A: 3 Portfolios 




































Panel B: 5 Portfolios 




































Panel C: 10 Portfolios 






































 29Figure 1 
Momentum Profits in Floor and Automated Sub-periods 
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